Volume 81

Issue 3

Article 9

April 1979

A New Look at the Section 119 Meals and Lodging Exclusion
Steven Luby
West Virginia University College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, and the Tax Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Steven Luby, A New Look at the Section 119 Meals and Lodging Exclusion, 81 W. Va. L. Rev. (1979).
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol81/iss3/9

This Student Note is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research
Repository @ WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The
Research Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu.

Luby: A New Look at the Section 119 Meals and Lodging Exclusion

A NEW LOOK AT THE SECTION 119 MEALS
AND LODGING EXCLUSION
One of the most problematic areas of income tax law has been
the excludability of various employee fringe benefits from taxable
income.' This article examines the appropriate tax treatment of
one type of fringe benefit-meals furnished by an employer to his
employee.
Prior to 1954 the excludability of the value of meals furnished
by an employer was dependent upon whether the factual circumstances of the case satisfied a "convenience of the employer" rule
developed by administrative rulings and case law. 2 In 1954 Congress attempted to end the confusion surrounding the excludability
of meals furnished by an employer by enacting section 119 of the
Internal Revenue Code.3 Through this enactment the Congress not
only codified the convenience of the employer rule, but it also
created a new "on the business premises" requirement.' In addition to these two statutory requirements, the legislative history of
section 119 reveals that the meals exclusion applies only to the
value of meals furnished in kind.5
The purpose of this article is to analyze the development of
these three integral tax concepts of the meals and lodgings statute:
first, meals furnished "for the convenience of the employer"; second, meals furnished "on the business premises"; and third, meals
furnished "in kind." In the wake of the traditional problems of
section 119 and due to two recent developments-the Supreme
Court decision in Commissioner v. Kowalski' and the 1978 section
119 amendment-a new look at the meals exclusion is required
before the appropriate tax treatment of section 119 can be assured.
I See generally 40 Fed. Reg. 41,118 (1975).
Stechel, Effect of Recent Supreme Court Decisions on the Use of Meals and
Lodging Exclusions, 20 TAX. FOR AccouNTANTs 216 (1978).
H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 18, reprintedin 119541 U.S. CODE
2

CONG. & AD. NEWS 4017, 4042.

Int. Rev. Code of 1954, ch. 1 § 119.
S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 19, reprinted in [1954] U.S.

CODE

&AD. NEws 4621, 4649.
6 434 U.S. 77 (1977).

CONG.

7 I.R.C. § 119 (1978). MEALS OR LODGING FURNISHED FOR THE CON-

VENIENCE OF THE EMPLOYER.
(a) Meals and Lodging Furnishedto Employee, His Spouse, and His
Dependents, Pursuant to Employment-There shall be excluded from
gross income of an employee the value of any meals or lodging furnished
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CONVENIENCE OF THE EMPLOYER RULE

Prior to the enactment of section 119 in 1954, the excludability
of meals from income was dependent upon whether the court determined that the "convenience of the employer" was served by
the furnishing of meals to the employee.' Both the courts and the
Bureau, however, have not consistently agreed upon the proper
interpretation of the convenience of the employer rule.9 One definitional approach-aptly named the employer's characterization
rationale-was espoused by several early administrative rulings"
and can also be found in several cases." In applying the employer's
to him, his spouse, or any of his dependents by or on behalf of his employer for the convenience of the employer, but only if(1) in the case of meals, the meals are furnished on the business
premises of the employer, or
(2) in the case of lodging, the employee is required to accept such
lodging on the business premises of his employer as a condition of his
employment.
(b) Special Rules.-For purposes of subsection (a)(1) Provisions of employment contract or state statute not to be
determinative.-In determining whether meals or lodging are furnished
for the convenience of the employer, the provisions of an employment
contract or of a State statute fixing terms of employment shall not be
determinative of whether the meals or lodging are intended as compensation.
(2) Certain factors not taken into account with respect to meals.-In
determining whether meals are furnished for the convenience of the employer, the fact that a charge is made for such meals, and the fact that
the employee may accept or decline such meals, shall not be taken into
account.
(3) Certainfixed chargesfor meals(A) In general-If(i) an employee is required to pay on a periodic basis a fixed charge
for his meals, and
(ii) such meals are furnished by the employer for the convenience of
the employer, there shall be excluded from the employee's gross income
an amount equal to such fixed charge.
(B) Application of subparagraph (A)-Subparagraph (A) shall
apply(i) whether the employee pays the fixed charge out of his stated
compensation or out of his own funds, and
(ii) only if the employee is required to make the payment whether
he accepts or declines the meals.
Matter in italics added by § 205, P.L. 95-615 (1978).
Stechel, supra note 2, at 216.
Commissioner v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77, 84-90 (1977).
O.D. 514, 2 C.B. 90 (1920); O.D. 914, 4 C.B. 85 (1921).
" Jones v. United States, 60 Ct. Cl. 552 (1925); Doran v. Commissioner, 21
T.C. 374 (1953).
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characterization rationale, tax consequences ultimately turn upon
a determination of the employer's intent. 12 If it is factually determined that the employer intended the meals furnished to be a form
of compensation to his employees, the value of the meals furnished
is taxable.' 3
The following examples illustrate how factual circumstances
can disclose the bona fide intentions of the employer in furnishing
meals to his employees: first, a federal statute that identifies the
meals provided to a government employee as compensation;" second, an employer's company policy of including the value of meals
furnished to his employee in the calculation of vacation, sick pay,
or compliance with minimum wage laws;' 5 and third, a managerial
policy of posting the cost of the meals furnished to employees into
the company's salary account.'" Regardless of the declarations of
the employer, his "characterization" of the meals as compensatory
in the above examples was sufficient to warrant their inclusion in
the employee's income.
The business necessity rationale, however, has been the more
common application of the convenience of the employer rule. This
rationale was adopted by several administrative rulings' 7 and became the authoritative standard of the Internal Revenue when a
1940 revenue ruling'8 stated: "As a general rule the test of the
convenience of the employer is satisfied if living quarters or meals
are furnished to an employee who is required to accept such quarters and meals in order to properly perform his duties."'
The business necessity rationale can also be found in an early
2
which held that the
Tax Court case, Kitchen v. Commissioner,'
'

Commissioner v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77, 85 n.16 (1977).

'3

434 U.S. at 85.

" Diamond v. Sturr, 116 F. Supp. 28 (N.D.N.Y. 1953) rev'd by 221 F.2d 264
(2nd Cir. 1955) (New York Civil Service classified meals and lodging furnished to
state employees as compensation for federal tax purposes).
'1 Bittker, The Individual as Wage Earner, 11 N.Y.U. INsT. ON FED. TAXATION
1147, 1152-53 (1953).
"s O.D. 914, 4 C.B. 85 (1921) (under this ruling the meals and lodging received
by employees of the Indian Bureau of the Department of the Interior were determined to be compensatory by the nature of the accounting entry made on the books
of the Interior Dept.).
' O.D. 814, 4 C.B. 84 (1921) (cannery workers); O.D. 915, 4 C.B. 85 (1921)
(hospital workers).
" Mim. 5023, 1940-1 C.B. 14, 15.
Id. at 15.
2' 11 B.T.A. 855 (1928).
"
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exigencies of the hotel business in this case were not sufficient to
establish that meals were furnished to the hotel manager for the
convenience of his employer. In two succeeding Tax Court cases,
Benaglia v. Commissioner" and Van Rosen v. Commissioner,2 the
business necessity standard was regarded as the authoritative interpretation of the rule. Van Rosen is of particular interest because
it expressly states that the ends of the employer's business must
dominate and control and not his intentions.n
Despite growing support for the business necessity rationale in
the courts, the Internal Revenue became apprehensive about the
use of "convenience of the employer" as a catchall phrase to rationalize a meal exclusion. Consequently, the Internal Revenue
withdrew its previous support for the rule and instead relegated it
to a test applicable only in cases where the compensatory character
of the meals could not otherwise be determined. 24 According to a
mimeographed letter of the Treasury, 2' the real issue became
whether the surrounding circumstances-without regard to the
convenience of the employer-showed that the meals were compensatory. 6
The Tax Court was noticeably shaken by the Bureau's sudden
change of mind. In Doran v. Commissioner2 it too declared that
the convenience of the employer rule was no longer the determinative test. But the court's holding did not reflect the broad compensatory inquiry enunciated in the above mentioned mimeo. 21. 1 In-

stead, the decision was determined by the existence of a state law
which characterized the meals furnished as compensation. 28 The
court attempted to apply the employer's characterization rationale
previously rejected in Van Rosen and simultaneously claim that
the convenience of the employer rule was no longer determinative.
The inherent contradiction evidenced in Doran indicates the consequences of the Internal Revenue's sudden rejection of the con.36 B.T.A. 838 (1937).
17 T.C. 834 (1951).
2 Id. at 838.
21 Mim. 6472, 1950-1 C.B. 14, 15.
5 Id.
21
2

26Id.

21 T.C. 374 (1953).
n Mim. 6472, 1950-1 C.B. 14.
21The court states: "[ilt is apparent from the South Carolina statute that
the value of the petitioner's quarters is considered .

.

. compensation ....

[Clonsequently, there is no need to apply the convenience of the employer rule."
21 T.C. 374, 376 (1953).
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venience of the employer rule without reinstituting a practicable
standard.
In 1954 Congress attempted to end the resulting confusion by
enacting section 119.29 Despite early differences, " the House of
Representatives and the Senate agreed that the convenience of the
employer rule be reestablished as the primary test for the exclusion
of meals and lodging.31 However, Congress did not reveal which
prior interpretation of the rule would be authoritative. It was not
until the Supreme Court's recent ruling in Commissioner v.
Kowalski that the business necessity rationale was established as
the controlling statutory interpretation of the convenience of the
employer rule. 2 While the Court in Kowalski reasoned that the
business necessity rationale was authoritative since it was controlling prior to the enactment of section 119, 33 the statute itself clearly
repudiates the employer's characterization rationale and thus affirms by implication the business necessity standard.-4 Section 119
itself expressly provides: "In determining whether meals or lodging
are furnished for the convenience of the employer, the provisions
of an employment contract or of a state statute fixing terms of
employment shall not be determinative of whether the meals or
lodging are intended as compensation.""
Since the business necessity rationale can now be regarded as
the only authoritative interpretation of the convenience of the
employer rule, the question arises whether the Treasury's
"substantial noncompensatory business reasons ' ''15-' test promulgated prior to Kowalski is still viable. According to the Treasury,
meals will be regarded as furnished for a noncompensatory business reason when they are furnished to the employee so that he
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, ch. 1 § 119.
H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 18, reprinted in 119541 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 4017, 4042; S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 19, reprinted
in [19541 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4621, 4649.
1, H. CONF. REP. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 119541 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5280, 5286.
32 434 U.S. 77, 93 (1977).
" The Court stated: "As we have noted above, Van Rosen v. Commissioner,
17 T.C. 834, provided the controlling court definition at the time of the 1954 recodification and it expressly rejected the Jones theory of 'convenience of the employer'-and by implication the theory of O.D. 514-and adopted as the exclusive
rationale the business-necessity theory." Id.
3' I.R.C. § 119 (1978), supra note 7.
SId.
, 26 C.F.R. § 1.119-1(a)(2)(i) (1977), T.D. 6745, 1964-2 C.B. 42, 43.
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may be available for emergency call during his meal period,-" or
when the employee must be restricted to a short meal period and
can not be expected to eat elsewhere in such a short period, 7 or
when there are insufficient eating facilities in the vicinity of the
employer's premises2
The regulations also provide that an employee furnished
meals for a noncompensatory business reason-such as being required to be on duty at all times-is entitled to a meals exclusion
even though the state statute regards such meals as compensation .31 Meals are not furnished for a noncompensatory business
reason, however, when they are designed to promote the morale or
goodwill of the employee or to attract prospective employees."
Meals furnished before or after the working hours of the employee
or on non-working days are also not generally regarded by the
Treasury as furnished for the convenience of the employer.', The
net result of a survey of these Treasury regulations reveals that
even though the term "noncompensatory business reasons" purports to encompass a broad compensatory test, the regulations, in
actual application, illustrate an adherence to the business necessity maxim: the meals must be necessary for the proper performance of the employees duties.
The most frequent and also most troublesome application of
the convenience of the employer rule arises where an employee is
"on call" for his employer during his meal hour. This issue has
been predominantly litigated by hotel managers and state troopers. The regulations provide that, in order for an employee to be
deemed "on call," it must be shown that emergencies have actually occurred, or can reasonably be expected to occur, and would
potentially result in the employer calling on the employee to perform his job during the meal period.2
The "on call" inquiry is well illustrated in a 1971 revenue
ruling. 3 Here, the Internal Revenue ruled on the tax treatment of
free meals furnished to a corporation's main office and branch
3626 C.F.R. § 1.119-1(a)(2)(ii)(a), T.D. 6745, 1964-2 C.B. 42, 43.
37 26 C.F.R. § 1.119-1(a)(2)(ii)(b) (1977), T.D. 6745, 1964-2 C.B. 42, 43-44.
26 C.F.R. § 1.119-1(a)(2)(ii)(c) (1977), T.D. 6745, 1964-2 C.B. 42, 44.
3126 C.F.R. § 1.119-1(d)(1977), Example (5), T.D. 6745, 1964-2 C.B. 42, 44.
'0 26 C.F.R. § 1.119-1(a)(2)(iii) (1977), T.D. 6745, 1964-2 C.B. 42, 44.
41 26 C.F.R. § 1.119-1(a)(2)(ii)
(1977), T.D. 6745, 1964-2 C.B. 42, 43; But
compare 26 C.F.R. § 1.119-1(a)(2)(ii)(f) (1977), T.D. 6745, 1964-2 C.B. 42, 44.
2 26 C.F.R. § 1.119-1(a)(2)(ii)(a) (1977), T.D. 6745, 1964-2 C.B. 42, 43.
- 26 C.F.R. § 1.119-1 (1977), Rev. Rul. 71-411, 1971-2 C.B. 103.
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office employees under three different factual circumstances. 4 The
first factual situation involved employees who were required to
remain at their desks-where they were served lunch-in order to
45
answer infrequent telephone calls by customers of the employer.
The second situation involved employees who were subject to call
during their lunch hour but ate in the dining room.46 Both of these
groups of employees were allowed a meal exclusion by the Internal
Revenue." A third group of employees who were free to run personal errands during the meal period, however, were not allowed
an exclusion."' The Bureau concluded that this third group was
generally not "needed" for urgent business and therefore it was
unlikely their meals would be interrupted for such purposes.
The Bureau's ruling should be compared with the recent case,
Commissioner v. Kowalski, in which the Supreme Court required
a New Jersey state trooper-who was "on call" while eating his
mid-shift meal in a highway restaurant-to demonstrate that the
meal allowance was necessary for the trooper to properly perform
his duties. 0 Despite the state's contention that the meal allowance
system was necessary since otherwise the trooper would be required to leave his assigned area of patrol unguarded for extended
periods of time, 5' the Court held that the record did not suggest the
meal allowance was a business necessity.52 One can speculate that
the Court believed that the freedom of the trooper to eat anywhere
inside the patrol area or to bring his meal into the patrol area were
both sufficient to undermine the necessity of a state trooper eating
his mid-shift meals at a highway restaurant. Kowalski, therefore,
could be regarded as a substantial narrowing of the business newhere the employee cannot make any
cessity rule to situations
52other accommodations.

'

The better view is that the Court's holding was an expression
4, Id. at 104.

I/d.
42

Id.

47Id.

4 Id.

Id.
434 U.S. 77, 95 (1977).
Id. at 79-80.
12 Id. at 95.
521 But see United States Junior Chamber of Commerce v. United States, 334
F.2d 660, 664 (Ct. Cl. 1964). The court held that section 119 does not require that
the lodging be so necessary to the proper performance of the employee's duties that
the absence of such lodging would render the performance virtually impossible.
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of its indignation over the blatant compensatory character of the
New Jersey cash allowance system and not a narrowing of the
business necessity standard. The Court intermixed the business
necessity inquiry with an altogether separate in-kind inquiry. If
the Court had solely considered the business necessity standard
without reference to the cash allowance system, the state trooper
should have been adjudicated to be "on call" because the state
trooper could demonstrate that highway emergencies could be reasonably expected to occur and he would be required to respond to
these emergencies during his meal period. The meals were therefore necessary for the trooper to properly perform his duties.
While the decision in Kowalski raises speculation concerning
the judicial tone of future applications of the rule, the Court did
not resurrect a new tax concept or even undercut the present position of the Treasury. The Court's decision, however, is important
because it has prevented the "convenience of the employer" from
application as a mere catch phrase. The "business necessity" rationale is now both practicable and authoritative. Consequently,
judicial equivocation previously tolerated in the application of the
convenience of the employer rule can no longer be justified.
II.

BUSINESS PREMISES REQUIREMENT

To be eligible for the meals and lodging exclusion, the employee's meals must be furnished "on the business premises" of the
employer5 3 Unfortunately, the legislative history of section 119
does not clarify the limitations that geographical boundaries place
on the business premises requirement. 4 In fact, the only inkling of
the meaning of "on the business premises" is provided by the
Conference Report, which states, "the term 'business premises
of the employer' is intended, in general, to have the same effect
as the term 'place of employment.' ,5 Identical language can be
found in the regulations."
But even though the legislative history does not adequately
define the scope of the requirement, three interpretations of the
term "on the business premises" can be identified. The first ap5 I.R.C. § 119 (1978), supra note 7.
H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 18, reprinted in [19541 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD.NEws 4017, 4042; S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 19, reprinted
in [19541 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD NEws 4621, 4649.
H. CONF. REP. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5280, 5286.
w 26 C.F.R. § 1.119-1(c) (1977), T.D. 6745, 1964-2 C.B. 42, 45.
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proach, a strict geographical application, would limit the meals
and lodging exclusion only to meals eaten at the employer's office
building, cafeteria, factory building, etc. The courts, however,
have not limited the meals exclusion only to situations where the
meals are furnished in the principal structure located on the business property of the employer.57
A second application, a "functional approach," enlarges the
scope of the business premises requirement to wherever an employee conducts a substantial portion of his duties or wherever the
employer conducts a significant portion of his business." This
functional approach is analogous to cases involving the civil procedure question of jurisdiction over property, when for purposes of
garnishment, a debt can be attached in whatever jurisdiction the
debtor can be personally served.-9 Likewise, for purposes of section
119, a business premises can be found at whatever place the employee performs his duties of employment.
A third application, the "proximity approach," allows an exclusion not only at the place where the employee performs his
duties but also "near the place" or "in the vicinity of the place"
where the employee performs his duties." Since no services are
rendered on the business premises where the meals are furnished,
the proximity approach is essentially a functional approach devoid
of geographical boundaries. Nevertheless, the proximity approach
is not generally utilized since most courts hold the word "on"
should not be construed to mean "nearby" or "in the vicinity of." 6'
The functional approach appeared first in a 1964 Court of
Claims decision, United States Junior Chamber of Commerce v.
2
United States.1
In this case, the business premises was defined as
"the premises on which the duties of the employee are to be per" Lindeman v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 609, 614 (1973); see also, Stechel, supra
note 2, at 218.
" Commissioner v. Anderson, 371 F.2d 59 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 387
U.S. 906 (1967).
' M. GREEN, CIVL PROCEDURE at 38 (5th ed. 1977).
" See United States v. Morelan, 356 F.2d 199, 203 (8th Cir. 1966). The court
held Congress did not put geographical bounds on the business premises of the
employer.
" Stechel, supra note 2, at 219; Commissioner v. Anderson, 371 F.2d 59,67 (6th
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 906 (1967).
11United States Junior Chamber of Commerce v. United States, 334 F.2d 660
(Ct. CI. 1964).
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formed."" But in Anderson v. Commissioner,64 the Tax Court went
beyond this decision and allowed a meals and lodging exclusion
claimed by a motel manager who lived two blocks from the hotel
where he worked. The court reasoned:
To conclude that property owned by an employee within two
short blocks of a facility managed by an employee who is required to be on 24-hour call for the management of the business
is not on the business premises within the meaning of Section
119 ...

is too restrictive an interpretation."

Two years later the Tax Court retreated from the "proximity approach" implicit in Anderson and emphasized that meals must be
furnished "on the business premises." In Dole v. Commissioner,"
the court ruled an employee who lived in a company owned house
approximately one mile away from the mill could not exclude the
cost of meals or lodging even though the taxpayer had supervisory
duties which required him to live in close proximity to the mill.,7
The court expressed doubt that Congress ever intended section 119
to apply to situations where the employee does his work in one
location and resides at another location some distance away."6 In
a concurring opinion Judge Raum stressed that no business of the
employer was conducted in these company owned houses."
When the decision in Anderson was appealed, the Sixth Circuit did not hesitate to overrule the earlier Tax Court's holding."
Relying heavily upon the concurring opinion of Judge Raum in
Dole, the Sixth Circuit responded: "[tio make 'two short blocks'
or nearness to the other property the test is to disregard the word
'on' as contained in the phrase 'on the business premises of the
employer.' -7,In contrast, the Sixth Circuit advocated that "on the
business premises" should only be construed as "either at a place
where the employee performs a significant portion of his duties or
on the premises where the employer conducts a significant portion
of his business." 72 In Lindeman v. Commissioner,3 the functional
0 Id. at 664-65.
- 42 T.C. 410 (1964), rev'd, 371 F.2d 59 (6th Cir. 1966).
5 Id. at 417.
Is 43 T.C. 697 (1965), aff'd, 351 F.2d 308 (1st Cir. 1965).
17Id. at 706-07.

"Id. at 707.
, Id. at 708.

7' Commissioner v. Anderson, 371 F.2d 59 (6th Cir. 1966).
7, Id. at 67.

n Id.
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approach espoused by the Sixth Circuit was adopted by the Tax
Court." Moreover, in a 1971 revenue ruling, 5 the Internal Revenue
ruled that meals furnished to branch officers at a place where the
employer performs a significant portion of his business qualified
these employees for the meals exclusion. 7
Although the Sixth Circuit has refused to extend the business
premises requirement beyond a functional view, it has acceded
that in some special circumstances "near the business premises"
may be so equivalent to "on the business premises" that it may
be absurd to distinguish between the two.77 This tax anomaly can
be found in Lindeman, a case in which the residence of the hotel
manager was located across the street from the hotel and adjacent
to its parking lot.78 The Tax Court allowed the exclusion on the
basis that the house was within the parameter of the hotel premises.7" It explained: "[tihe house in which . . .[the hotel manager] . . .lives is an indispensable and inseparable part of the
hotel plant."8 The court apparently considered the hotel, the hotel
parking lot, and the hotel manager's residence to be so closely
situated and interdependent that to attempt to distinguish them
would result in hairsplitting. In addition, the Tax Court has applied an "adjacent to the premises" concept where the apartment
of an employee was located one floor above the premises leased by
his employer for the business.8 '
The courts, however, have been divided on the question of
whether state troopers who receive meals in private restaurants
adjacent to a public highway are "on the business premises." Both
the First 2 and Fourthm Circuits have rejected the "adjacent to the
premises" argument presented by state troopers in New Hampshire and West Virginia respectively. These circuits contend that
the private restaurants are not a place where the employee per" Lindeman v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 609 (1973), acquiescencein, 1973-2 C.B.
at 2.
74Id.

at 615.
1126 C.F.R. § 1.119-1 (1977), Rev. Rul. 71-411, 1971-2 C.B. 103.
7' Id. at 104.

Commissioner v. Anderson, 371 F.2d at 67 (6th Cir. 1966).
7'Lindeman v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 609 (1973).
n Id. at 612.
Id. at 617.

Giesinger v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 6 (1976).
Wilson v. United States, 412 F.2d 694 (1st Cir. 1969).
" Koerner v. United States, 550 F.2d 1362 (4th Cir. 1977).
"

12
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forms a significant amount of his duties.84 The state troopers were
off duty and therefore these highway restaurants do not satisfy the
business premises requirement."
On the other hand, the Third," Fifth, 7 Eighthm and Tenth8
Circuits find the construction of the opposing First and Fourth
Circuits theoretically arguable but nevertheless unrealistic in view
of the special nature of the state trooper's work. 8 The Eighth Circuit even rejected any contention that Congress placed any geographical bounds on the business premises requirement.' In its
view, the major business of the state's law enforcement agency
covers every highway in the state;" therefore, since meal facilities
cannot be made available "on the highway" it would be ludicrous
to prohibit a meals exclusion on the basis that the restaurant was
physically adjacent to, a quarter of a block, or a mile away from
the highway.
In the case of the state trooper, the crux of the "on the business premises" issue is whether the state trooper is "on call" or "off
duty." Although the holding in Commissioner v. Kowalski was
adverse to the New Jersey state troopers, the Court did not address
the business premises question. In fact, the frequent emergency
duties of a state trooper seem to be in accord with the Treasury's
"on call" regulations. 3 On this basis, the state trooper would be
on the business premises since he performs significant duties of his
employment at the restaurant-being "on call" for highway emergencies.
If the state trooper is adjudicated to be off duty while eating
his meals in a private restaurant off the highway, as the First and
Fourth Circuits contend, the business premises requirement would
not be satisfied since neither the employee nor the employer performs a significant portion of his business in such a restaurant. At
this point, since the state trooper is not "on" the business premises
" Wilson v. United States, 412 F.2d 694, 696 (1st Cir. 1969).
' Id.
u Kowalski v. Commissioner, 544 F.2d 686 (3rd Cir. 1976), reu'd, 434 U.S. 77
(1977).
United States v. Barrett, 321 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1963).
United States v. Morelan, 356 F.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1966).
'5 United States v. Keeton, 383 F.2d 429 (10th Cir. 1967).

:0 United States v. Barrett, 321 F.2d 911, 912 (5th Cir. 1963).

1 United States v. Morelan, 356 F.2d 199, 203 (8th Cir. 1966).
92 Id.

,3 26 C.F.R. § 1.119-1(a)(2)(ii)(a) (1977), T.D. 6745, 1964-2 C.B. 42, 43.
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he can only hope for a rare application of a "proximity" approach
or advance an "adjacent to the premises" argument alluded to by
the Sixth Circuit in Commissioner v. Anderson.9 But even the Tax
Court should be wary of holding ihat a public highway and its
"adjacent" private restaurant are integral parts of the same business property. Furthermore, "adjacent" has been so loosely applied in state trooper cases that the integrity of the term is questionable where a restaurant is not contiguous to the highway but
located two blocks or even a mile away. It would be more appropriate to characterize such highway restaurants as "in the vicinity of"
the public highway and thus disclose a clear departure from a
functional approach.
Despite the stretching of the business premises requirement
by courts favorable to state troopers, the preeminence of the functional approach remains generally intact. The functional approach
has been adopted by both the Internal Revenue Service" and the
Tax Court." In general, the circuit courts have also utilized this
approach. " But as the state trooper cases have disclosed, the
"significance" or "substantiality" of the employee's duties necessary to satisfy the business premises requirement will ultimately
be dependent upon both the factual circumstances of the case and
the conservative or liberal attitude of the court.
Ill. IN-KIND REQUIREMENT
The in-kind requirement cannot be found in the text of section
119. Nevertheless, its authority is assured by the Supreme Court's
recent interpretation of the statute's legislative history. ' 0" In
Commissioner v. Kowalski, the Court emphatically stated: "The
form of § 119 which Congress enacted in the Senate and the report
accompanying the Senate Bill is very clear: 'Section 119 applies
"

371 F.2d 59, 67 (6th Cir. 1966). (Next footnote number is 97)

'?26 C.F.R. 1.119-1 (1977), Rev. Rul. 71-411, 1971-2 C.B. 103, 104.

Lindeman v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 609, 615 (1973).
Koerner v. United States, 550 F.2d 1362 (4th Cir. 1977); Wilson v. United
States, 412 F.2d 694 (1st Cir. 1969); Commissioner v. Anderson, 371 F.2d 59 (6th
Cir. 1966). But see Kowalski v. Commissioner, 544 F.2d 686 (3rd Cir. 1976), rev'd,
434 U.S. 77 (1977); United States v. Keeton, 383 F.2d 429 (10th Cir. 1967); United
States v. Morelan, 356 F.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1966); United States v. Barrett, 321 F.2d
911 (5th Cir. 1963).
'" Commissioner v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77, 84 (1977):
"
"
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only to meals furnished in kind.' "0" Although the viability of the
in-kind requirement itself can no longer be challenged, its scope
remains an unsettled issue. In the past, three general types of
business meal policies instituted by employers have been problematic for the courts: (a) the meal or subsistence allowance, (b)
salary deductions from the employee's salary, and (c) a policy of
reimbursement for meals actually paid for by the employee for
meals eaten in the course of his duties.
A cash or subsistence allowance is a regular stipend paid to
the employee to "reimburse" him for the cost of his subsistence.
As the Kowalski case illustrates, a cash allowance is not a bona fide
reimbursement but instead contains compensatory features. "'' In
Kowalski, the New Jersey state trooper received an annual stipend
of $1,740 as a "reimbursement" for the cost of meals incurred while
on patrol."'3 The payment of the stipend, however, was not even
contingent upon the state trooper spending his allowance on meals
or even accounting for the money spent on midshift meals. '"' Also,
the amount of the allowance was determined by officer rank.'"
Furthermore, the meal allowance was paid even if the trooper was
not on patrol.' Thus, Kowalski was an easy "in-kind" case for
the Court since the New Jersey cash allowance meal plan was exactly the type of meal plan singled out by the legislative history
of section 119 as includable in income1' 7 The substantive issue in
Kowalski that occupied the Court's attention was not the in-kind
or in-cash distinction but whether section 119 preempted the
once-recognized doctrine that benefits conferred on an employee
for the convenience of the employer were not taxable income.',
In some cases the duties of the employee may require the
furnishing of meals but the employer may not wish to provide free
meals to his employees. Instead, the employer may choose to
charge the employees a fixed or varying rate. For example, Em101Id.
"1 Id. at
10

Id.

80.

10 Id.
105Id.

to$ Id.
I" S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 19, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE
& AD. NEws 4785, 4825, which reads in pertinent part: "Section 119 applies
only to meals and, lodging furnished in kind. Therefore, any cash allowances for
meals or lodging received by an employee will continue to be includable in gross
CONG.

income to the extent that such allowances constitute compensation."
ImCommissioner v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77, 84-95 (1977).
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ployee X has a base salary of $10,000 and Employer Y deducts $40
per month for the meals furnished to Employee X. A question
arises whether the $40 per month is excludable from the income
of Employee X.
Prior to 1964 both the Tax Court and the Treasury held that
these salary deductions were taxable income;' 0 therefore, Employee X would be required to report as taxable income the full
0
$10,000. In Boykin v. Commissioner,"1
the Eighth Circuit disagreed with these holdings. The court concluded that the net economic benefit to the employee was the same whether the salary
was paid at a net amount with no charge for the meals or at a gross
amount with a deduction for meals."' The Eighth Circuit also
rejected any contention that Congress limited the meals and lodgings exclusion to meals furnished without charge."'2 In later years,
the Internal Revenue and the Treasury conceded the result in
Boykin."'
Commissioner v. Kowalski, however, discourages the excludability of cash payments of any kind under section 119, and thus
logically intimates a return to the pre-Boykin position. But the
statute, as recently amended, dispels the Court's apparent notion
that all financial transactions are precluded by the in-kind requirement."' According to the amended statute: "In determining
whether meals are furnished for the convenience of the employer,
the fact that a charge is made for such meals, and the fact that an
employee may accept or decline such meals, shall not be taken into
account.""' Special rules apply to fixed charges. According to the
amended statute, a fixed charge is excludable only if the employee
is required to make the payment whether he accepts or declines the
meals."06 In addition, it makes no difference whether the fixed
charge is paid out of his stated compensation as a salary deduction
or paid out of the employee's own funds on a periodic, basis."'
The amendment of section 119 negates any judicial notion
that only free meals are excludable under the meals and lodgings

''

R. PAUL & J. MERTENS, LAW
260 F.2d 249 (8th Cir. 1958).

"'

Id. at 254.

'1

oF FEDERAL INcoME TAXATION §

11.16 (1934).

Id.
26 C.F.R. § 1.119-1 (1977), Rev. Rul. 59-307, 1959-2 C.B. 48.
11 I.R.C. § 119 (1978), supra note 7.
ItsId.
"

Its Id.
117Id.
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statute. The presence of a financial transaction-such as a salary
deduction-is no longer a justifiable basis on which the "in-kind"
and "in-cash" distinction can be made. But this proposition is not
unique to the amended statute. The legislative history of the original statute intimated that only the value of meals provided must
be furnished in kind and not the actual meals themselves.""
But what is meant by the "value" of meals furnished to an
employee? Value denotes the monetary worth of something, that
is, its equivalent in goods, services or money. In Commissioner v.
Kowalski, for example, the Court correctly determined that the
New Jersey cash allowance system did not contain the features of
a simple reimbursement plan." ' -' This plan would not assure that
the state troopers would receive only goods, services or money that
constituted a fair return on the cost of midshift meals required by
their employment. The amendment to section 119 has extended
this value concept to salary deductions." ' Here, the "value" of the
meals excludable is equivalent to either the amount the employee
pays on a periodic basis or the amount deducted by the employer
from his salary.'20
Since the value of meals furnished is the appropriate guide for
applying the in-kind requirement, a bona fide reimbursement plan
should be excludable from the income of the employee. But in
Kowalski, which was decided prior to the amendment of section
119, the Court did not distinguish between meal reimbursement
plans and cash allowance systems. In fact, the Court stated:
"By its terms § 119 covers meals furnished by the employer and
not cash reimbursements for meals."'"' Following this statement
by the Supreme Court, one district court, in Smith v. United
States,1 held that the Kowalski decision precluded even a bona
I H.R. REP. No. 1232, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 3815, 4239, which reads: "The legislative history of Section 119

indicates that. its exclusion applies only to the value of meals furnished in kind."
(emphasis supplied) It is noteworthy that the legislative materials pertaining to the
original 1954 statute did not use the word value but merely said "the exclusion
applies only to meals furnished in kind." Commissioner v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77,
84 (1977). See infra note 123.
11.1 Commissioner v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77, 80-81 (1977).

I' I.R.C. § 119 (1978), supra note 7.
120 Id.
2I Commissioner v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77, 84 (1977).
" 41 AFTR 2d 78-1161 (D.C. Miss.). Cash reimbursement was income to
Mississippi state policeman. This case had been redecided in light of Kowalski.
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fide reimbursement plan from qualifying as a meals exclusion.
The resolution of the meal reimbursement issue lies primarily
in the legislative history of the original statute, which reads:
"Section 119 applies only to meals or lodging furnished in kind.
Therefore, any cash allowances for meals or lodging received by an
employee will continue to be includable in gross income to the
extent that such allowances constitute compensation."'2 The Supreme Court has interpreted the second sentence of the above
quote as a reference to another section of the code."u The more
cogent interpretation is that the in-kind requirement was directed
at cash allowance systems that exceed the value of such meals
furnished. The surplus cash received would represent compensation and thus be includable in income. Furthermore, since the
amended section 119 now allows a meals exclusion for salary deductions, consistency requires that a bona fide meal reimbursement plan would also be excludable. The net economic benefit to
the employee is the same whether the employee is provided free
meals or whether the employee pays for the meals and is later
reimbursed for their actual cost.
It is also noteworthy that in Commissioner v. Kowalski the
Court specifically declined to rule upon two types of meal reimbursement policies outside of the parameters of section 119: the
exclusions for "supper money" and "sporadic meal reimbursements."" ' , Subsequent judicial developments indicate that prior
judicial acquiescence to these two exclusions is waning. In Central
Illinois Public Service Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court
intimated that lunch expenses may be held to constitute taxable
income to employees who are reimbursed. 2161 In addition, two recent
Tax Court cases and one letter ruling indicate that the mere fact
that a taxpayer works an extra long day does not make his dinner
deductible. 2 ' While the tax treatment of "supper money" and
I S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 19, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 4785, 4825.

"I Commissioner v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77, 94-95 (1977), refers this language

to I.R.C. § 162(a)(2).

MId. at 92 n. 28. The Court said: "We do not decide today whether, notwithstanding § 119, the 'supper money' exclusion may be justified on other grounds. Nor
do we decide whether sporadic meal reimbursements may be excluded from income." See O.D. 514, 2 C.B. 90 (1920).
1- 435 U.S. 21, 24 (1978). The Court held that reimbursements of lunch ex-

penses of employees on non-overnight company travel were not "wages" for the
purpose of the withholding provisions.
I? 20 TAx. FOR AccouNTANTs 139 (1978); Picknally, T.C.M. 1977-321 (P-H);
Melsa, T.C.M. 1977-415 (P-H).
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"sporadic meal reimbursements" are not synonymous with the
section 119 inquiry, the Court's increasing scrutiny of these two
fringe benefits indicates a conservative attitude in the Supreme
Court toward the taxation of meals and lodgings in general. This
judicial attitude, however, may now conflict with the spirit of the
recent amendment of section 119.
IV.

CONCLUSION

While the meals and lodging exclusion remains a forum for
judicial dispute, for the first time the inquiry can be reduced to
three legal rubrics. Now, in making the meals and lodging inquiry,
three questions must be asked: Are the meals necessary for the
proper performance of the employee's duties? Were the meals furnished to the employee at a place where the employee performs a
significant portion of his duties or where the employer performs a
substantial portion of his business? Was the value of the meals
furnished to the employee in-kind? A negative answer to any one
of the above questions will preclude a meals exclusion under section 119.
The first two questions are the product of the judiciary's futile
attempt to implement two standardless statutory requirements.
But recent developments indicate that the "convenience of the
employer" rule and the "on the business premises" requirement
will no longer operate as mere catch phrases. Commissioner v.
Kowalski demonstrates that "convenience of the employer" is now
a misnomer and in the future a "necessity of the business" rule
must be satisfied. The regulations provide ample insight into
what circumstances will satisfy this current business necessity
standard. In addition, by refusing to construe the term "on the
business premises" as the equivalent of "near the business premises," the courts have also clarified the geographical scope of the
business premises requirement.
The in-kind inquiry is the most difficult application of the
meals and lodging exclusion. It is clear that cash allowance systems will not satisfy the in-kind requirement." It is also evident
that the "value" of meals furnished can no longer be narrowly
restricted to "meals themselves" or "free meals" and may now
include various financial transactions. Meal reimbursement plans
have yet to find judicial acceptance but salary deductions adminis,In Commissioner v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77, 94-95 (1977).
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501

tered by employers and periodic payments made by employees are
now clearly excludable if the requirements of section 119, as
amended, are met. 2 ' In light of the amendment, the most appropriate basis for delineating between "in-cash" and "in-kind"
meals is whether the value of the meals furnished the employee
confers the same economic benefit upon the employee as if he had
been furnished free meals by his employer.
Steven Luby
In I.R.C. § 119 (1978), supranote 7.
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